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Theatrical Space
James Hamilton
Theoretical literature on theatre offers us two main lines of thought about 
theatrical space. These are derived from semiotic and from phenomenological 
analyses of theatrical performance, respectively. Both approaches are motivated in 
part by the obvious fact that there are theatrical effects associated with such things 
as the size of performance space, the positions, and changes in position both among 
performers and between performers and spectators. Each approach seeks to explain 
the target effects in terms of the background theory each brings to the table. Each 
approach encounters its own special, and apparently insuperable, difﬁculties.
Phenomenological approaches correctly appreciate the fact that many of the 
effects of theatre and of theatrical space in particular are subliminal effects, causally 
produced and received, so to speak, below the threshold of conscious spectator 
attention. But these approaches are also committed to the claim that spectators not 
only always experience an illusion of space in the theatre but also enter into the 
illusion of space, a different space than the physical space of the theatre.1 And it 
is not clear how those spaces are connected, nor is it at all obvious that spectators 
do enter into such illusions, given that they know they are attending a theatrical 
performance.
Semiotic approaches correctly reject the claim that all experience of theatre 
is the experience of illusions, but do so by being committed to the claim that 
each thing that appears in theatrical space, and theatrical space itself, is always 
signiﬁcant, meaningful.2 But plainly this is not so. Insofar as ﬁnding devices to 
focus spectator attention is central to the performer’s craft, not only are many things 
that appear on stage not meaningful, it would be a theatrical disaster if they were. 
Given the sheer number of things a spectator could focus on in any ﬁnite stretch of 
time, some things will have to be removed or hidden from focus, and essentially 
rendered meaningless, in order for a spectator to ﬁnd meaningful those things she 
does. Moreover, there are performances in which many things clearly present and 
in focus for spectators resist semiotic analysis.3 But most importantly, defenders of 
phenomenological approaches are right to insist there are effects (and among them 
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many spatial effects) that induce reactions among spectators and that are received 
below the level of grasp of meanings.4
A problem common to semiotic and phenomenological approaches to theatre 
space derives from another, and fundamental, fact about theatrical space itself, 
namely, that spectators identify what is presented to them as happening in the real 
physical spaces of theatres. And some effort must be made to analyze this fact and 
to analyze the connections between that fact and the target theatrical effects with 
which we are concerned.
I.  A new direction
In this essay I sketch out in a new direction on these and related issues.5 I state 
and defend a series of claims each of which can be shown to be plausible on its own 
but when taken together form a coherent structure that provides a new alternative 
to semiotic and phenomenological approaches to these issues. An important fact 
is that each of the claims links up with the basic facts that theatrical performances 
take place in ordinary physical space, and spectators always understand this fact 
when attending a performance. In the ﬁnal section, I will argue that this coherent 
structure provides some additional beneﬁts that are not available from other kinds 
of theories.
To facilitate the discussion, I will frequently refer to several imagined 
performances, illustrative of idealized performance kinds.6 I will use the title 
Hedda Gabler when referring to a traditional narrative performance using Ibsen’s 
script. I will use the title Gabler at a Distance to refer to any Brechtian narrative 
performance using the same script. Burning Child will be the title of a Grotowski-
style performance that, at least in some attenuated sense, uses Ibsen’s script; and, 
depending on the use to which the script is put, it may or may not have some 
narrative structure. Finally, Spontaneous Beauty will be the title of an imagined 
narrative performance by Mabou Mines, using only three or four actors, Bunraku 
puppet techniques, and musicians.7
I will assume throughout an idea of “basic comprehension” or “basic 
understanding” of a theatrical performance. In speaking of basic understanding 
or comprehension, I do not mean getting a full measure of the signiﬁcance of the 
performance. Nor do I mean grasping what the performers were aiming at, nor what 
styles they employed and to what effect. Nor do I mean having a full appreciation 
of the performance’s artistry. Instead, I mean only what it is and what it takes for a 
single spectator to demonstrate she has grasped the gist of what is presented to her 
in the performance. Further I will assume the following conditions are adequate for 
determining when a spectator has basically comprehended a performance:
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A spectator has basic understanding of a theatrical performance 
if she (1) can describe the object that was presented over the 
course of the performance, (2) reacts physically in the right ways 
to what is happening in the performance as those things happen, 
or (3) adopts the moods responsive to what is happening in the 
performance as those things happen.
This formulation sets forth minimal success conditions for having understood a 
theatrical performance. That is, anyone who can do (1), or does either (2) or (3) 
would be said to have understood what she had seen or to understand what she is 
seeing by all but the least charitable of observers.
II.  Physical and affective responses of audiences are non-discursive evidence 
of understanding.
Although minimal, some may think these success conditions are actually overly 
generous. Suppose a spectator, let us call him Glenn, comes out of a Commedia 
performance laughing so hard he cannot speak. When asked, Glenn is unable to 
say what he just saw. Suppose he is never able to reconstruct a story line or to 
describe anything we would take as showing he had understood the performance. 
Suppose Glenn not only found the performance funny, he still laughs every time 
he thinks of it.8
Now suppose further we discover in talking to Glenn that he had seen a different 
theatrical performance only the week before and, although he could tell the story 
presented in the performance and can do so now, he was then and has ever since 
remained utterly unmoved by it.
The ﬁrst case is consistent with success conditions (2) and (3) for basic 
theatrical comprehension. But just as clearly it is a case in which many of us might 
hesitate to claim Glenn has understood the performance. In contrast, our second 
case presents a challenge from another direction because Glenn fails to react in 
ways that meet conditions (2) or (3). Nevertheless most of us would agree that 
Glenn had basic comprehension of the second performance.9
The problem highlighted by these cases lies with our acceptance of non-
discursive elements among the success conditions for basic understanding. For 
what is missing in the ﬁrst case but is clearly present in the second is discursive 
evidence of comprehension. The ability to describe what one has audited is a 
cognitive capacity. The reactions and moods a spectator experiences need not be 
cognitive. If they are not, one wonders why we should think of them as evidence 
of understanding at all.  
Moreover, there is a natural causal story to tell about the ﬁrst case, namely, that 
Glenn’s reactions and moods in that case were merely caused. No recognition of 
24                                                              Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
the triggers or even of the fact there are triggers for these reactions and moods was 
needed in order for them to be induced. Insofar as there is no recognition, there is 
no cognition, and no understanding either. This suggests it is simply a mistake to 
take Glenn’s reactions and moods as evidence of comprehension; and so we should 
jettison conditions (2) and (3) altogether.
One reason for resisting this suggestion is that performers count on observing 
precisely these kinds of reactions in order to gauge how the performance is going 
and what changes might be need to be made to steer the performance in the right 
direction.10 If spectators’ reactions and moods are never signs of comprehension then 
performers are surely mistaken to try to gauge those reactions for the reasons they 
do. So I wish to insist that physical reactions and adoption of the moods responsive 
to what has happened during the performance may be reliable evidence of basic 
understanding of a performance.
Another reason for regarding physical reactions and mood shifts as evidence 
of cognitive grasp of a performance is seen in the following hypothetical case. 
Esmerelda leans back in anticipation during Hedda Gabler at the moment Hedda 
crosses the room and pulls the pistol out of its case. Later, Esmerelda is unable to 
say that, at the time, she thought or feared Hedda was about to commit suicide. 
She may not even have been aware of leaning back and, being unaware of her own 
behavior, she may not be able to say why she did it. Don’t we still want to treat 
Esmerelda’s reaction as evidence she comprehended what was about to happen?
We do, I think; and so we have to go against some very powerful intuitions 
if we do not regard reactions and mood shifts as cognitive. We may capture those 
intuitions by employing some of the machinery of counterfactual conditionals.11 If 
a spectator has a certain physical reaction or mood shift at a given moment during 
a performance, she could have had others at the same time, but did not. Some of 
those alternative but unrealized physical reactions or mood shifts are consistent 
with what she would describe were she, or any other basically comprehending 
spectator, to provide discursive evidence of comprehension.  But other reactions 
and mood shifts are not consistent with such a description.  Let us make this idea 
more precise in the following ways: 
•   Let “a reaction is consistent with a description” mean that 
the reaction is one among those reactions that would be 
appropriate responses to a recognition that could be recorded 
in a description.
•   Let “a reaction is consistent with another reaction” mean that 
both are within the range of appropriate responses to the same 
recognition.
•   A spectator’s reaction is evidence of comprehension if, had she 
not reacted as she did, she would have reacted in some other way 
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consistent with her actual reaction and if the set of reactions she 
would have had is consistent with a correct description of what 
was presented, whether the relevant description is offered by 
that spectator or not.
By this means we also can state precisely when a reaction or mood shift is not 
evidence of basic theatrical understanding: either the reaction is not consistent with 
other ways of reacting that are consistent with a correct description or it belongs to 
an entire repertoire of reactions that is inconsistent with a correct description.12
This account of the role non-discursive reactions play in grasping a performance 
allows us to demonstrate why Esmerelda’s reaction to Hedda’s behavior is a sign 
of comprehending what is about to happen: it is so precisely because her reactions 
to what is going on at that moment are consistent with all other reactions and 
mood shifts consistent with any description of Hedda as about to commit suicide, 
whether or not Esmerelda can provide that description. And this strategy allows us 
to rekindle our conﬁdence that when Glenn laughed at the Commedia performance 
he really had understood the comedy, even though he could not tell the story he 
had seen. He laughed because any other reaction he might have had would have 
been consistent with recognizing what there was to laugh at even though he could 
not describe what that was.
III.  The attention of spectators converges upon roughly the same features 
among the many features performers present to them.
Why is it that spectators usually mention pretty much the same features of 
what they saw when talking to each other after a performance? To explain this, 
we must resolve two issues, one about performers and one about spectators. With 
regard to performers, we must know what informs a spectator that certain features 
of the performers are characteristics of or facts about one of the objects of the 
performance–traits of a character, for example–and that other features are not. 
This is no mean feat. In an entertaining and widely used book on script analysis, 
David Ball notes there is usually a good deal more information about characters in 
novels and people in real life than there is about characters in scripts. “In fact,” he 
writes, “you probably know more about most acquaintances than anyone knows 
about Hamlet.”13 Characters, he reminds us, are “minimally extant in scripts, 
skeletal accumulations of carefully selected traits . . . because the nature of any 
stage character is heavily determined by the actor in the part.”14 This means that a 
signiﬁcantly greater number of the features of a performer will also be characteristics 
of or facts about a character in the performed story than are referred to in the script 
on which the performance is based. Spectators notice a good many of a performer’s 
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features, and they are supposed to. So Ball’s observation puts pressure on us to be 
generous in considering which performer features are character features.
But consider the question, “Does Hamlet have blue eyes?” Surely, many 
performers who have played Hamlet have had blue eyes and many others have 
not. For each performer playing Hamlet, there is a determinate answer15 to the 
question, does she or he have blue eyes? But, unless and until a performance makes 
something of the question with respect to Hamlet, the question of Hamlet’s eye 
color does not have a determinate answer. And, when it does, it has an answer only 
relative to a particular performance or production. The point is that the number of 
features of any given performer who plays Hamlet is far greater than the number of 
features that enable a performer to ﬁt the description, “playing Hamlet.” Many of a 
performer’s features go unnoticed, and they are supposed to. These considerations 
put pressure on us to be fairly cautious in considering which performers’ features 
are characteristics of characters.
Given these opposing pressures, we might think audiences would have a lot 
of difﬁculty ﬁguring out what features of the performers to attend to in order to 
grasp the characteristics of the characters. But they do not. So what is needed is 
some principled account of what individual spectators do that explains how these 
matters are managed.
The problem about spectators is that each spectator brings a different context 
and history to any given performance. A spectator may share some aspects of 
her background with all other spectators. They may all recognize they are at a 
theatrical performance. If one of them knows they are attending an off-Broadway 
production, probably they all know this. But they may not share other aspects of 
their backgrounds even with respect to theatre: the kinds of theatre one has seen 
could be quite different from and independent of the kinds another has seen; one 
may have seen a lot of performances by this company and they may be familiar 
to her, while another may be seeing one of their performances for the ﬁrst time. 
Moreover, there are likely to be some aspects of one spectator’s background that 
no other spectator will bring to the performance: one may have just taken a very 
difﬁcult trip and be mentally exhausted; another may be preoccupied with her 
late husband’s suicide. So, we may think, their experiences are so different they 
cannot have understood the play in the same way.16 Yet, according to a reasonable 
principle of “cognitive uniformity,” if there is to be genuine understanding by any 
one of them, then what is understood by one spectator must be understandable by 
most others.17
Consider then a character in a play who has an eager thirst. I propose this:
Spectator S understands, when presented feature f of performer J, 
that C has an eager thirst” is true just in case, for some spectator 
S, some performer J, and some character C
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(1) S responds to feature f as salient, under conditions of common 
knowledge that spectators are attending a theatrical performance, 
for a fact or set of facts that would lead one to conclude that C 
has an eager thirst or that will be recognized as inconsistent with 
alternatives to C’s having an eager thirst,18
(2) S concludes that C has an eager thirst,
(3) feature f is salient for C’s having an eager thirst.
The account of feature saliency relied on here is dependent upon the notion of 
salience employed in game-theoretical analyses of rational choice in coordination 
problems. In those analyses, a feature is said to stand out from others when there 
is a trigger that is not speciﬁc to the feature itself or the problem itself that makes 
the feature stand out. Instead, the trigger is determined by contextual elements.
Two people are talking on the phone when they are suddenly cut off. They 
cannot communicate with each other and yet both want to continue the conversation. 
Moreover each knows the other wishes the same. How are they to re-establish 
contact? Each has the option of either calling the other or waiting. For them to 
succeed in re-establishing contact, clearly one must wait and the other must call; 
but there is no feature of their situation that would tell either of them who should 
call and who should wait.
In “one-off” situations, like this variant of David Lewis’s “telephone game,”19 
where the “game” is only played once, there simply is nothing either of these people 
knows about the situation or each other that prompts them towards choosing a 
strategy to employ. If they knew more about each other, perhaps, they might know 
how the other would reason. But they do not. So there is no solution.
Lewis recognized that people do solve many coordination problems in everyday 
life and that, therefore, in many situations there must be some features that do 
“stand out” for all the participants in virtue of which they make their choices. He 
also realized that what made those features stand out is external to the terms of the 
coordination problem itself. To illustrate this, change the telephone game as follows. 
First Person knows that Second Person has a white telephone and that Second Person 
knows that he himself has a black telephone. First Person and Second Person are 
inveterate chess players and each knows this about the other. Since white always 
goes ﬁrst in chess, First Person reasons he should wait for Second Person’s call 
and reasons that Second Person will reason in the same way.
Note that a tendency to notice a feature is salient can be thought of as “non-
rational” when there is no reason, related to what is being coordinated, for 
preferring one choice to another.20 Thus, a feature is salient to an individual as a 
result of non-rational tendencies to notice some features and to choose strategies 
because those features are present.21 But this does not mean that no one is doing 
any reasoning. Indeed, in ﬁnding a feature salient, each party is making a guess as 
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to what feature others will respond to, and reasoning from that to the conclusion 
that the same feature will stand out for the others and that they too will reason as 
he is reasoning: and thence reasoning to a conclusion about how to act.
In these kinds of situations, referred to as “standard” coordination problems,22 
people are analyzed as “players” engaged in determining courses of action that 
will have the optimal “payoff.”  There is symmetry between the players, both in 
respect of what they are trying to do–namely, the same thing–and in respect of what 
they know about each other. So some aspects of standard coordination problems 
are different from the situation of spectators in relation to a performance.  In this 
regard, I follow Robert Sugden who modiﬁes this model for use in analyzing 
situations of discovery. As a result I will not use the term “players” and take the 
people involved to be seeking certain “payoffs.” Instead I suggest we think of 
spectators as “learners” 23 seeking to acquire an ability, the ability to describe the 
object developed in the performance.
The situation of spectators of performances is very like that of players in 
standard coordination problems in most other respects. 
Features of a performer are salient to a spectator for a fact or 
set of facts just when the learner-spectator, under a suitable 
common knowledge requirement, can notice those features as 
regularities in the behavior of the performer and when the learner-
spectator concludes (a) that some pattern–and hence some set 
of facts–obtains, (b) that whenever those features appear in the 
same context then the same set of facts obtains, and (c) that every 
other learner-spectator will conclude both (a) and (b).
As in standard coordination problems, conditions (a) and (b) specify that a feature 
is salient if it is thought to guide responses, if it is seen as projectible. And, just as 
in standard coordination problems, condition (c) speciﬁes that a feature is salient 
if it stands out as projectible for a population.
Clearly, a great deal of weight must be carried by the “common knowledge” 
clause. Whether the view works out is dependent on whether spectators can actually 
know enough to guarantee at least roughly the same features will be picked out and 
on whether it is reasonable to expect that spectators will usually know that much 
information about each other.  Four bits of knowledge suggest themselves.
First, if one spectator knows she is at the theatre, probably they all, or at least 
most of them, do so as well. Second, one of the aims of spectators of theatrical 
performances is to understand the performance that they see. Each spectator also 
knows that whatever she says when discussing a performance with others will 
not be counted as demonstrating understanding if it does not agree in the main 
with the characteristics others are discussing. So there will be conservative social 
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pressure both to look for and respond to the same features that others are likely to 
ﬁnd salient and to track precisely those in developing the description of the content 
of the performance.24
A third fact is that spectators’ physical reactions are “catching.” When 
one laughs, for example, others tend to do as well. Laughter is often said to be 
“contagious.” Anne Ubersfeld makes this and related observations the basis of a 
detailed analysis of spectator pleasures.25 And, of course, laughter is but one of 
many involuntary or nearly involuntary responses that are contagious.
A fourth and crucial fact it this: spectators go to theatrical performances 
expecting performers to present them with an ordered sequence of materials to grasp. 
They are rarely disappointed in that particular regard.  When they are disappointed, 
spectators are apt to feel more keenly the conservative social pressure to ﬁgure 
things out as others are.
Thus, the common knowledge requirement may be stated as follows.
Spectators know they are at theatrical performances; and, in 
knowing that she is at a theatrical performance, each spectator 
also has knowledge of the interests of her fellow spectators and 
of their felt reactions, as well as of the fact that each expects 
something will be put forward for all of them to gain.
This conception of common knowledge is satisfactory for the purposes of 
guaranteeing it is a reasonable expectation that spectators will converge on roughly 
the same features as salient for roughly the same patterns. First, this knowledge 
is not beyond the reach of what spectators can expect to know of each other. It 
is social knowledge that all spectators normally share. In particular, this kind of 
knowledge can be obtained without any spectator having access to others’ otherwise 
quite disparate backgrounds concerning what they bring idiosyncratically to the 
performance.
Second, this knowledge is all that spectators need by way of common 
knowledge of each other’s perspective. This is because knowing she is attending 
a theatrical performance includes knowing that performers are going to present 
something to understand and in a way that makes it (not always easily) accessible 
to the spectator. Because spectators know this about performers they anticipate 
attending to the performers in order to get what the performers have arranged for 
them to observe. They watch for what the performers do to enable them to get that 
object. And performers do present things for spectators to attend to in order that 
spectators might observe the object the performers develop over the course of the 
performance. Spectators do not know in advance what they will ﬁnd. But, crucially, 
they know that everyone else will be looking for the same things. Thus, while 
spectators are not guaranteed of ﬁnding the exactly and all the same things salient, 
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the common knowledge requirement proposed here guarantees the possibility, 
indeed the likelihood, they will ﬁnd roughly the same set of features salient.
A further beneﬁt of the feature-salience model for spectator convergence on 
features of performers is that it can easily be generalized to cover non-narrative 
performances. All that is required is to substitute terms for the relevant kinds 
of objects– “images” for “events,” for example–and the same structure applies 
throughout. So narrative theatrical performances do not have a privileged place in 
generating the theoretical structure.
IV.  How spectators identify and re-identify the objects presented to them in 
performances
Spectators demonstrate they have basic comprehension of a theatrical 
performance by describing the object that was developed in the performance. For 
example, if the performance is structured narratively, the object of that performance 
will be a story. When they describe or tell a story, they can be characterized as 
having been “thinking about” the objects of the story–its characters, events, and 
other objects such as skulls, hats, tables, books, pistols, and the like–and of the 
story itself, the object developed in the performance.26
To have thoughts about characters and events in plays spectators must be able 
to identify characters when they appear and events when they happen and then to 
re-identify characters when they appear again.27 And spectators appear to do just 
that.
If Hedda Gabler appears in one performance of a traditional production 
using Ibsen’s script for Hedda Gabler, spectators expect to see her again in other 
performances in the same production. If spectators have seen one performance of 
that kind, they have no difﬁculty re-identifying Hedda if she subsequently appears 
in performances of the same general kind yet very different productions from 
the one in which they ﬁrst saw her. The ﬁrst may have been a production with 
naturalistic setting, costumes and props; the next with almost no props, no set, no 
period costumes; and a third might have naturalistic production values, but be set in 
a swimming pool outside a Malibu beachfront house with swimwear for costumes, 
and pool toys for props.28 It does not matter in which order a spectator encounters 
such a performance. The ability to identify and re-identify characters–and all other 
objects as well–survives changes in performances within productions, changes in 
productions, changes in settings, and changes in performers as well.
Once introduced to a character, or to any other object of the content of a 
narrative performance, most spectators have no trouble re-identifying that object 
even in radically different kinds of narrative performances. If spectators ﬁrst see 
Hedda in Gabler at a Distance, most will have little trouble re-identifying Hedda 
in traditional performances or even in performances like Spontaneous Beauty. 
Spring 2007                                                                                                             31
And, again, the order of encounters does not seem to matter. The ability to identify 
and re-identify objects of narrative theatrical performances survives even radical 
changes in the kind of narrative performance employing those objects.
Imagine what appears to be a traditional style of performance, using much 
of Ibsen’s script for Hedda Gabler, but telling a story in which what had been 
supporting characters, such as Lovborg, Aunt Juliane, and Tesman, are now the 
performance’s major characters, and their situation is the focus of the story.29 
The company might be exploring the idea we have limited knowledge of where 
we come from and too little time to ﬁgure life out before we die. Or they might 
be exploring themes suggested by Elinor Fuchs’s discussion of the Nietzschean 
conﬂict between Tesman and Lovborg.30 The point is that, were Hedda to appear 
in this play, as Hamlet does in Rosencrantz & Guildenstern are Dead, spectators 
familiar with any of the productions described in the previous paragraphs would 
still recognize her as Hedda. Once again, the order of the encounter does not seem 
to matter. The ability to identify and re-identify objects of narrative theatrical 
performances survives even some changes in the roles of the objects where those 
changes are due to changes in the story.
Characters are not the only objects in a story that get identiﬁed across 
performances by spectators. Andrew Sofer remarks that
The stage life of props extends beyond their journey within a 
given play.  As they move from play to play and from period to 
period, objects accrue intertextual resonance as the absorb and 
embody the theatrical past.31
As Sofer’s case studies show, props have a variety of functions, some of which they 
can only play if they are objects recognized across performances.32
In sum, the ability to identify and re-identify characters–and all other objects as 
well–survives changes in performances within productions, changes in productions, 
changes in settings, and changes in performers. The ability to identify and re-identify 
objects in plays survives even radical changes in the kind of narrative performance 
employing those objects. The ability to identify and re-identify objects in plays 
survives even some changes in the role of the objects where those changes are due 
to changes in the narrative.
We should want an explanation for these facts. What underwrites our capacity 
to identify and re-identify the elements of the content of performances? I suggest 
we begin by examining how it is spectators identify and re-identify these objects 
in very familiar cases. Accordingly, I will focus on identiﬁcation of characters and 
ask how it is that spectators identify Hedda in any traditional performance using 
Ibsen’s script for Hedda Gabler.
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IV.a.  Initial identiﬁcation of characters and other objects in narrative 
performances
We might try this: spectators ﬁrst develop lists of characteristics from what they 
see when they ﬁnd certain features salient, projectible, and attempt to locate the 
object that is the bearer of those characteristics or properties. This “list view” holds 
that possession of correct descriptions–consisting of correct lists of characteristics–
is sufﬁcient for identiﬁcation of the thing possessing the characteristics. But the 
list view has things the wrong way round. A spectator may not realize she is in 
possession of a correct description until she recognizes, or fails to recognize, the 
thing in question. Suppose a company has chosen to craft a short theatre piece 
using only and most of the language of Ibsen’s script, right up to the point in the 
script where, in a traditional narrative performance, one character says, “Good 
Morning Hedda dear,” and audiences looking, see her. But this is not a traditional 
narrative performance; rather it is performed as a spoken “choral” work including 
some contrapuntal part-work for ﬁve voices, and employing abstract movements 
based in the rhythms of the language uttered. The language of this piece is no 
less informative about Hedda’s characteristics than is the language of a narrative 
performance. Indeed the second performance might even aim at bringing out 
precisely these same characteristics and to reach a kind of climax at the last words 
of the piece, “Good Morning Hedda dear.”
 But the features of performers that the spectators of the short choral piece 
ﬁnd salient for characteristics of Hedda do not enable them to identify anyone who 
is Hedda. And that is because no individual (or even group of them) appears who 
could be identiﬁed as her. We must have a particular someone in mind in order 
to ascribe those characteristics to someone, and having someone or something in 
mind requires already having identiﬁed her or it. So having in mind a correct list 
of characteristics is not sufﬁcient for having identiﬁed Hedda.
What else is needed?
In the opening act of a performance of a Hedda Gabler, spectators are 
provided a good deal of information of various kinds about Hedda. After some 
time, spectators then see a ﬁgure arrive from or at a particular space before them. 
Or perhaps they hear utterances before they see anything, but these utterances 
come from some particular location in the space. Most spectators react physically 
to these movements or sounds. By these means, spectators are prepared to locate 
something or someone on which to hang the characteristics they have in mind; 
and, then, most spectators do identify someone as that one there. There is a spatial 
element in identiﬁcation. It is by thinking about that one there that audiences are 
able to think about that one and ascribe characteristics they already have in mind 
to a particular individual. What happens in this case is consistent with what is 
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called “demonstrative identiﬁcation” ﬁrst explored by Bertrand Russell and later 
developed by Gareth Evans.33
Demonstrative identiﬁcation necessarily involves location of the object in 
egocentric space. That is, to pick out something in the environment in the relevant 
way is to react to its location, as given by the senses, relative to oneself. This does not 
require believing something like “Oh, something is over there;” for one’s reaction 
to a thing’s position is often nothing more than the turning one’s head or leaning 
one’s body in the direction of some sound or movement, without any thought at 
all. It may not even be necessary that one be conscious in order to be disposed in 
this way.34 The disposition to physical movement in reaction to the sensed place of 
things is what is central to the capacity to locate them in egocentric space.35
But it is not enough be able locate something in egocentric space, for this 
gets us at most a sense of “here,” of “there,” and perhaps “here and then there.” 
What more is required36 in most circumstances is that we impose our knowledge 
of some non-egocentric space in which things happen on our egocentric space or, 
to put it the other way round, to locate our egocentric space within the framework 
of non-egocentric space. In everyday life, the relevant non-egocentric space is 
the public space of which we form cognitive maps, that is, the objective spatial 
relations among things. What non-egocentric space is in theatrical performance 
requires more detailed discussion (see Section V below).  
The point to notice here is that theatre spectators frequently locate characters 
in egocentric space without prior lists of any characteristics in mind. This happens 
at the beginning of very nearly every narrative theatrical performance. Spectators 
may have no prior knowledge of the characters and events in the story–they may 
not even know it will be a narrative performance–and they still locate the things 
that are characters in the ﬁrst moments of a performance. This fact highlights 
the point, already mentioned, that identiﬁcation is largely a matter of responding 
behaviorally to the locations of sounds and movements of those characters. And 
it strongly suggests that identiﬁcation of the elements of a theatrical performance 
involves the same kind of demonstrative identiﬁcation that goes on in everyday 
life, and that demonstrative identiﬁcation in theatre also grounds our capacities to 
have descriptive thoughts about characters and other objects so that our descriptors 
are thoughts about those things.
Three requirements are critical to our ability to attach descriptive thoughts 
to what is demonstratively identiﬁed. The ﬁrst is that there must be some object 
that is identiﬁed; the second is that a subject must be able to track the same object 
through some substantial period of time;37 and the third is that this ability to track 
over time must allow for changes in the positions, for movements, of both subject 
and object.38  
It cannot be stressed enough that, read realistically,39 the ﬁrst requirement 
may be taken to exclude our ability to demonstratively identify characters and 
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events in narrative performances and, so, to attach descriptive thoughts to them. 
But a realist reading of the ﬁrst requirement is presumptive: we have no basis for 
introducing metaphysical concerns at this point. As regards the phenomenology 
of our perception of characters and events and the relation of that phenomenology 
to the epistemological analysis we connect with it, it appears so far that we just 
do demonstratively identify characters and events in performances. And it appears 
we use the same mechanisms to learn who characters are and what they are doing 
that we use regarding any other objects and agents in the world. So, I read the 
ﬁrst requirement as a description of our experience rather than as a metaphysical 
commitment. Taken as a reﬂection of our experience with these matters, therefore, 
the ﬁrst requirement is satisﬁed. It is Hedda audiences are learning about, including 
the fact her name is “Hedda.”40 The second and third requirements are likewise 
satisﬁed: once spectators have identiﬁed Hedda demonstratively, they track her 
during the time she is there and in the space where they ﬁrst noticed her, now noting 
additional characteristics the performers make salient for them.
IV.b.  Re-identification of characters and other objects in narrative 
performances
In the ﬁrst act of the performance Hedda Gabler, Hedda is engaged in 
conversations with Tesman, Aunt Juliane, and Mrs. Elvsted. Spectators learn a 
good deal more about her in these conversations, and again much of what they 
learn comes by way of information presented in the form or Hedda’s reactions to 
others and their reactions to her. At the appearance of Judge Brack, Hedda leaves 
to show Mrs. Elvsted out, then returns to ﬁnish a conversation with Tesman and 
Judge Brack. Upon her return, no spectator would be surprised to hear Judge Brack 
address her as “Mrs. Tesman.” For it is the same character who left only moments 
before who has returned. But how do audiences know this ﬁgure is still Hedda?
The answer lies in the fact spectators take that one there to be the same 
character that only moments before had left and who now has returned. That is, 
her location in space is linked to the time it takes for her to leave and come back. 
A ﬁgure appears and, to all appearances, is Hedda; but what actually underwrites a 
spectator’s re-identiﬁcation of Hedda is that her appearance is distinctive enough, 
in the spatio-temporal setting of the performance, to allow the spectators to locate 
her in egocentric space as the object of their continued thought. They are still 
thinking about her, this one, because they know the spatio-temporal setting of the 
performance has not changed. And they also know that because they know they 
have not moved. They have thereby established a relevant “area of search.”
Appeal to spectators’ knowledge of their own spatio-temporal situations 
supports identiﬁcation and re-identiﬁcation within single performances. Spectators’ 
knowledge of where they have been undergirds estimates of how long a character 
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has been gone. And this works within a single performance of traditional duration 
because the time any character is out of sight and not tracked is relatively short.
But it is not obvious why such an appeal should work to support re-identiﬁcation 
across performances, productions, performance kinds, changes in stories and so on. 
When there has been a substantial gap in time or place since the original sighting, 
it is implausible to think any spectator has been tracking any character’s location. 
There is no plausible area of search that depends on the kinds of estimates that 
work within single performances. Spectators may not even know, in the relevant 
sense, where they have been in the meantime.41
V.  The special nature of theatrical uses of ordinary physical space
There are three ways to orient yourself that add up to subsuming egocentric 
space to non-egocentric space. First, in most everyday circumstances the relevant 
non-egocentric space is simply the public space deﬁned by our cognitive maps of the 
objective spatial relations among things. This can be thought of in two ways.  Each 
corresponds to a way that people have a grasp of those objective spatial relations. 
Each can be illustrated by a way in which you might give directions. The ﬁrst is by 
reference to compass points or street addresses: “from here you go north ﬁve blocks 
and turn west onto Laramie Street, and the address is 1702 Laramie Street.” The 
second is by specifying a route: “from hear you go along side that long aluminum 
fence until it ends and then you turn left just before the big Lutheran Church; the 
bar is just ahead on your right; look for the big red dog on the roof of a building 
and it is just past that.” We rely on knowing where we are in identifying objects (in 
this case, the bar) by reference to egocentric space subsumed under our cognitive 
map of public space in one of these two ways.
Second, in some circumstances the time and distance lapse may be so large 
you cannot say with precision where you have been in the interval. In these kinds 
of circumstances, you rely more heavily on familiarity with lists of characteristics. 
Even so, you still do so in relation to remembered spatial location, as when you 
are trying to determine if the route you are following is the correct route to your 
friend’s house in a city you have not visited in some years. In such circumstances 
you conﬁrm that a given route is a route you have been down before because it 
prompts you to remember features, or you reject a given route as in fact not familiar 
because if fails to prompt you to remember features or the features it has are too 
dissimilar to secure recognition.
A third kind of circumstance involves a distinction among kinds of spaces or 
locations. And you appeal to the kind of locations you are in when recognition occurs 
independently of your knowledge of where you have been in an interval, no matter 
how long. For example, you are capable of recognizing your own radio in your own 
home even if there are thousands that look just like it somewhere and even if you 
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have not been home for some time. In contrast, there are some location kinds that 
disable recognitional capacities. If your radio appeared in “the police display of 
stolen goods,” to use one of Evans’s examples, it is unlikely you will be able to tell 
your own radio from any others in the universe. In this kind of location, having lost 
track of where the radio has been, and having no coherent story to tell about where 
you have been that would support a claim about the relevant area of search, you are 
unable to employ the techniques you have ready to hand in the other cases.42 An 
important, even if completely obvious, aspect of this kind of circumstance is this: 
knowledge of the kinds of spaces that enable recognition is a posteriori knowledge, 
it is not something one comes to know without some experience.
Any adequate deﬁnition of “performance space” should both encompass but 
also allow us to distinguish among dance and theatrical performances, spectator 
sports, company picnics, and religious rituals.43 To meet this desideratum, a 
deﬁnition must entail that performance spaces are particular uses of literal space; for 
all of these kinds of performances just do take place at speciﬁc physical locations. 
Accordingly, I follow out a line of thought suggested by Augusto Boal, Peter Brook, 
and Hollis Huston, and propose we deﬁne performance space as follows.44
Broadly speaking, a “performance space” is an active observation 
space (a) that is created in literal space by the actions of some 
people who, by those actions, not only become either performers 
or spectators but also turn other people into either spectators 
or performers and (b) in which whatever spectators observe is 
observed in that literal space during the time those actions govern 
the behavior of the parties involved.
This deﬁnition does not pick out anything distinctive about theatrical space; but 
it does allow room to think of theatrical space as a species of performance space, 
more generally. The fact something is a theatre space only if it is a species of 
performance space, involving the creation of active observation space, does not 
entail there is anything of particular value in live performance that cannot be found 
in other forms of performance. There may be some value added by liveness; but 
that is not certain,45 and it plays no factor in the issues we are discussing here.
What is important is that the fact something is a performance space if and only 
if it involves the creation of an active observation space entails that performance 
spaces, including theatrical spaces, are kinds of places exactly analogous to other 
non-egocentric space kinds–i.e., uses of literal space–such as “homes,” “police 
displays,” and “playing ﬁelds,” under which a spectator’s egocentric space can 
be subsumed. This fact ensures that performance spaces play the right kind of 
roles–as relevant areas of search–for underwriting the recognition of characters 
in the challenging cross-performance cases. Such spaces will be non-egocentric 
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in the right way because they will be determined relative not to where spectators 
know they have been, but relative to their knowledge of the kind of place they 
were in when the original sightings took place. So it is that, because spectators 
originally identiﬁed Hedda in a theatre space, they are able to recognize her again 
when watching a new theatrical performance of whatever kind in a relevantly 
similar use of space.
This approach brings out sharply why the list view cannot be the right 
fundamental story. For, were you reminded of Hedda Gabler by someone you 
encountered in the street, you would not think you had recognized Hedda. And no 
amount of subsequent, new, and conﬁrming characteristics evident in this person’s 
behavior would convince you otherwise. We understand that a street is simply the 
wrong kind of space in which to meet Hedda. Just as the locale of the police display 
of stolen goods typically disables your ability to recognize your own radio, a street 
is the kind of place that typically disables recognition of theatrical characters.
To be sure, before you learn how to assess which non-egocentric spaces 
underwrite which re-identiﬁcations, it is completely open to you to suppose, for 
example, that you can identify your radio in the police display of stolen goods. 
You have to learn that this is a non-egocentric space in which, no matter that you 
can subsume egocentric space to it, you are still unable to pick out that radio which 
is the one you have encountered before, namely, yours. Correspondingly, if you 
have learned that the space in which you originally saw Hedda is a theatre space, 
then you have a grip on the kind of space that is involved in re-identiﬁcations. And 
even if there are cases that are problematic in this regard, in most cases you have 
no expectation of recognizing Hedda again except in that kind of space, that is, in 
ordinary space used in that kind of way.46
This approach also brings out in sharp relief that the idea of a special kind of 
space–where that is understood as “semic” or “ﬁctive” or not otherwise identical 
to the literal ordinary space used in a certain recognizable way–is simply not 
plausible as a candidate for delivering an area of search that a spectator relies upon 
in determining which object she is thinking about. For there is no literal route for 
a spectator to trace in determining the relevant area of search if one of the spaces 
she has to know how to get to is not a literal space. Re-identiﬁcation of those same 
props, images, actions, and individuals across performances is based upon a non-
metaphorical appreciation of the fact the original sightings in which observation 
relationships were set up were in ordinary, literal space.
So here I appeal to an economy of thought. Theatre space is what works as the 
non-egocentric kind of space to which spectator-subjects subsume their egocentric 
locations when demonstratively identifying who or what it is they are thinking about 
in all cases: cases of ﬁctional narrative performances, of non-ﬁctional narrative 
performances, and of non-narrative theatrical performances. The explanation is 
general, serving all identiﬁcation and recognition.
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VI.  Some beneﬁts of the accounts defended in this essay
Individually and taken together, these accounts point out how to explain 
several phenomena that are of deep and abiding interest to theatre theorists. They 
do so, moreover, without running afoul of the problems besetting semiotic and 
phenomenological theories of theatre.
VI.a.  Double-focus and slippage
You go to the theatre to watch a performance called “Hedda Gabler,” a 
narrative theatrical performance of a quite familiar kind. As you watch the ﬁrst 
scenes unfold, you ﬁnd yourself waiting for the appearance of the title character. 
When she does appear, however, you are immediately troubled. You have been 
led by the interchanges among the other characters already on view to speciﬁc 
expectations concerning many of Hedda’s characteristics. You are not entirely 
disappointed: for example, her physical demeanor is imperious. But, as soon as 
she opens her mouth to speak, you are shocked. You cannot take your eyes off the 
gap caused by her two missing front-teeth. The lisp caused by the gap grates upon 
your ears. After some time you conclude that what shocked you are features only 
of the performer and are not characteristics of Hedda.47 After more time you may 
even forget about it. Or you may still ﬁnd yourself noticing these features of the 
performer from time to time, but they may only be as occasional distractions from 
the unfolding narrative of the play.
Features of performers are just anything about a performer to which a person’s 
attention could be drawn. This may include what she is wearing, the mole on her 
neck, the ﬂat twang in her voice, the lift of an eyebrow, the droop of a shoulder, 
her crooked-back posture, her blue eyeliner. Any regularly recurring feature could 
be considered separately and, hence, focused on for itself. Let us refer to the sense 
many spectators can get, of having their attention drawn both to characteristics of 
the object being developed in the performance and to features of the performers, 
as the sense of “double focus.” Let us further refer to the sense spectators can 
get, of ﬁnding their attention going back and forth between these, as the sense of 
“slippage.”48
The phenomena of double focus and of slippage are consistent with and 
predictable on the feature-salience model for explaining convergence on features 
of performers that are projectible as characteristics of the objects of performance. 
These are predictable effects because the salience model relies explicitly on the 
fact spectators attend to performers’ voices and bodies. In adopting the model, 
we have sought to explain which features are connected to characteristics of the 
object performed and which are not, given that there are many more features of 
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a performer that spectators might attend to than performers plan to have noticed 
when developing and executing a performance.
The bodies and voices of performers are notoriously distracting.49 In attending 
to a performer a spectator may ﬁnd herself uncommonly focused on his unusual 
hands. Accordingly, she may lose track of the performance. But she may, instead, 
observe how the events in the play are reﬂected in the movements and the stillnesses 
of those hands. Or she may not be aware of the direction of her attention, yet still 
track the developing object. Another spectator may be attending only and exactly 
to whatever regularly occurring features the performers had planned to be noticed 
and tracked by an audience.
The fact that double-focus and slippage are predictable on the feature-salience 
model allows us to use it to ﬁrst clarify two signiﬁcant phenomena.
One of these is “performer power,” a group of phenomena that has attracted 
considerable attention in the philosophical and theatre studies literatures. One such 
phenomenon is an effect that Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Weinberg, following 
Stanley Cavell,50 call “star power.” Star power, as Weinberg and Meskin describe 
it, is the effect that occurs when a “ﬁlm star’s identity as star carries signiﬁcant 
weight, perhaps even more than the weight of the character he or she is portraying 
in any given ﬁlm.” Meskin and Weinberg refer to this effect as “psychological 
doubleness” and assert it “is no mere side-effect or cognitive quirk . . . [because] 
ﬁlmmakers count on it and exploit it.”51
Another “performer power” phenomenon is an effect that Marvin Carlson calls 
“the ‘ghosting’ of previous roles in [the] reception of later ones.”52 This effect is part 
of “the normal theatre experience . . . with an actor in previous roles,” and is analyzed 
by Carlson as delivering “an aura of expectations based on past roles.”53
Performer power is a wider phenomenon than either star power or the social fact 
and aura of celebrity. It is wider because it applies both to ﬁlmic and to theatrical 
performances. It is also wider because it is an effect exploited by many performers 
who are not stars and not familiar to spectators from past performances either. But 
it is, as Meskin and Weinberg assert, no mere side-effect of ﬁlmic and theatrical 
performance.
Performer power is to be anticipated on the feature-salience model. A performer 
in a play relies on the fact spectators will pay attention to her features in order to 
gain information about the character she is playing. Her features may be compelling 
because she is a star, or because she is familiar from past theatrical encounters, 
or only because she is striking in appearance or behavior. If her features are 
compelling, for whatever reason, then in some performance practices she would 
be wise to exploit spectator interest in her features in order to prime the feature-
salience pump.
A contrasting phenomenon to performer power is “character power,” which 
is the familiar fact that some performances are so striking that even those who 
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know better attribute characteristics of a character to the performer. And again, 
this phenomenon is to be expected on the feature-salience model. For, in any 
performance, some of the characteristics of a character simply are identical to 
features of the performer. Moreover, the idea of what it is to “know better” is 
explicable on the account we have adopted of the identiﬁcation and re-identiﬁcation 
of the objects of performance. Character power involves mistakes in re-identiﬁcation 
that take place when spectators encounter performers outside the theatre. There 
are two questions to answer. First, why don’t we anticipate seeing Hedda in the 
shopping mall next week?  And second, why don’t we usually see Hedda in the 
shopping mall? The answer to the former cannot be the same as the answer to the 
latter because on occasion we are indeed tempted to think we see Hedda in the 
mall, after all. And here is the sense of that: until an individual spectator learns 
that the theatre space is the kind of space in which she can reliably identify and 
distinguish among certain individuals and that the shopping mall is not a relevant 
area of search for those individuals, a spectator might well expect the ﬁgure she 
picks out in the mall to have the characteristics of a character she has seen in a 
recent performance. Once she has the relevant knowledge, she is far less likely to 
make those mistakes.
VI.b.  Issues about the materiality of the means of performance
The fact that double-focus and slippage are predictable on the feature-salience 
model can also shed light on two theoretical matters having to do with the materiality 
of the features presented to audiences, especially issues about the materiality of 
the performer’s body.
First, the materiality of the actor’s body has become a dominant theme in 
modernist drama and in theories of theatrical modernism. In a widely quoted 
remark Herbert Blau claims that “of all the performing arts, the theatre stinks most 
of mortality.”54 Hollis Huston denies there is much else possible in theatre but the 
persistent “gap…between the [material] performance and the thought performed.”55 
And Stanton Garner deﬁnes the modernist aesthetic for theatre this way: “to make 
the stage not simply stand in for reality but to become it.”56
The feature-salience model for basic comprehension describes and explains 
the fact that lies behind discussions of this aspect of the modernist movement in 
theatre. If spectators get the characteristics they grasp by attending to the features 
of performers, there is no reason that fact cannot become a theme of a movement 
in the history of theatre. And if the movement is one that focuses upon the means 
by which the art form achieves its effects, as modernism is sometimes said to be, 
then it will be no surprise to ﬁnd the fact of the performer’s body ﬁguring large in 
the themes and practices of the movement.
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The second, and related, issue is that, ever since modernist theatre practice and 
theory began to focus upon it, the materiality of performers and of other means of 
performance has come to be seen as a crucial point of division between semiotic 
and phenomenological theories of theatre. According to some, the materiality of 
the actor’s body marks the limit of what can be analyzed in terms of semiotics, in 
terms of signs and meanings. For, in some performances, bodies seem not to mean 
something (else) but to be something (i.e., themselves).57 Treating material things, 
such as props, as “signs” not only makes it difﬁcult to say what is and what is not a 
material object it also renders the pleasure to be found in them qua material objects 
inexplicable.58 According to others, the materiality of the performer’s body, while 
challenging to semiotic analysis, is not a fact a more sophisticated semiotic theory 
cannot handle. So we should adopt a semiological approach because nothing can 
be (just) itself once it is on the stage, which is a site of producing meanings.59 A 
standard argument for this view is that, since anything can go as a prop for anything 
else in a theatrical performance, then anything must act as a “sign” when it appears 
in a performance.60
The feature-salience model provides clariﬁcation here in two ways. First, while 
it is probably impossible for all the features of a given object to be found salient 
by some population of spectators for all of its own actual characteristics, this does 
not entail that no features of an object can be found salient for some characteristics 
of the object itself on some occasion. For stylistic reasons, a company could seek 
to call attention to the fact they have been using plastic toys for pistols in their 
performance. They will do this by enabling spectators to focus on certain of the 
features of their props–those features that are projectible for some of the very 
same characteristics that the object happens to have. Second, when we ask what 
features of a performer, a bit of the set or stage, or a property are projectible for 
some pattern or characteristics of some characteristic in the performed object–of 
an agent, of a room, of a pistol–there is no essential on-principle restriction on 
what those characteristics could be. Whatever restrictions there may be are set by 
styles of performance.
In the end, therefore, this is not an issue about objects on stage being signs 
and meanings and, so, becoming unable to be themselves. Nor is it about the 
limits to what can be a sign on the grounds that a thing is just itself on stage in 
some performances. This is instead an issue about theatrical styles and the uses to 
which materials can be put. If there are limits to those uses, that will be a discovery 
emerging in the historical practices of theatre, not from its philosophy.
Of course what is gripping about this debate has to do with the fact that 
spectators get what they do by attending to performers, sets and props. And that 
can be uncanny in some performance styles. But surely not in all. This is not, 
for example, a matter of real things breaking through the illusion common to all 
performances, as Bert States holds.61 But the reason theatrical performance does 
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not signiﬁcantly involve illusions about performers’ bodies has nothing to do with 
bodies being “signs,” as Anne Ubersfeld holds.62 The feature-salience explanation 
of basic understanding requires common knowledge among spectators that they are 
at a theatrical performance. And it is impossible to possess the knowledge required 
to explain spectator convergence on the same features and characteristics–the 
knowledge one is in a theatre with others–and simultaneously to enter into an 
illusion that one is not.63
VI.c.  Issues about “presence”
An added beneﬁt of the analysis of identiﬁcation and re-identiﬁcation of the 
objects of a theatrical performance I have just provided is that it enables us to make 
more precise the feeling people have of “being in the presence of” characters and 
other objects of theatrical performance,64 but without being committed to a spurious 
“metaphysics of presence.”
In an unproblematic sense of “presence,” if I am in your presence, then (a) 
I could see or hear you if I looked in your direction or turned my head towards 
the sounds you are making, (b) there would be some place quite nearby to which 
you could go such that I could not see or hear you even if I looked or turned in 
your direction, and (c) there is someplace quite nearby that I could go such that I 
could not see or hear you even if I looked or turned in the relevant direction. This 
suggests the sense in which we are in the presence of characters when watching 
theatrical performances.
 The physical notions that are involved in describing what it is to be in the 
presence of another are the same as those involved in descriptions of demonstrative 
and recognition-based identiﬁcation of characters and other objects of theatrical 
performances. Both involve pre-cognitive reactions to sounds and sights that 
trigger an organism’s directional responses. Both involve tracking an object in 
space over a stretch of time, the same kinds of loss of contact, and the same means 
of re-establishing contact.
Thus, this account allows us to explain why spectators are much less in the 
presence of characters and events when reading novels or works of dramatic 
literature. One thing we think is special about spectators’ encounters with characters 
and events in plays is that, in some sense, spectators are in the presence of characters 
and events in a way that they are not in most other art forms capable of delivering 
narratives. No matter how close one may feel to a character in a novel, one is never 
in any doubt that she is not in that character’s presence. On the accounts presented in 
this paper, that is simply because there never occur the kinds of physical reactions to 
characters that are possible, indeed crucial, in theatre. Similarly, even if a spectator 
reacts physically to movement (or apparent movement65) in movies, she is never 
in any doubt she is not in the presence of that movement. And this is because she 
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has no sense of tracking this one or that one through the physical space that she 
also inhabits. In this regard theatrical performance shares an important feature 
with dance performance.
This analysis of identiﬁcation and re-identiﬁcation of the objects of a theatrical 
performance requires that spectators learn that theatrical space is a use of literal 
space that underwrites areas of search within which spectators are able to recognize 
and identify characters and other objects they have previously identiﬁed. But that is 
just part of what it is to learn to go to the theatre. It does not entail a commitment 
to performance practices that seek to promote identiﬁcation with characters or 
even with performers. Being in their presence, in the sense explained here, may be 
what makes such identiﬁcation possible (if it does); but it certainly does not make 
it either inevitable or desirable.66
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model presented here works in a completely general way for any performance kind.
6. Imagining idealized theatrical performances has two forms. The aims of the two practices 
are, however, different. The ﬁrst form is the practice of “production analysis,” which aims to imagine 
full-blown performances when it is no longer possible to attend any actual performance. The aim is 
“to clarify possible meanings and effects, primarily for readers, critics, and theatregoers” and the result 
“should be improved understanding of the performance potentialities of the play at issue.” See Judith 
Milhous and Robert D. Hume, Producible Interpretation:  Eight English Plays, 1675-1707 (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois UP, 1989) 10. See also Andrew Sofer’s discussion of this practice in Andrew Sofer, 
The Stage Life of Props (Ann Arbor:  U of Michigan P, 2003) 3-6.
Philosophers, in contrast, use idealized cases in order to abstract those features of actual cases 
they think need explanation. Which aspects of a case needs explanation will depend on the question 
being asked. That is, given a well formed question about a group of actual cases, not every feature of 
each actual case will need to be explained, but only those relevant to the question. Accordingly, one 
way to disagree with a philosophical analysis, accordingly, is to argue that some features standing in 
need of explanation do not appear in the philosopher’s idealized cases.
7. Two points are worth mentioning here. First, this list does not exhaust the possibilities. These are 
all more or less narrative in structure; and many kinds of performances are not. Second, I do not intend to 
imply that the latter three are not performances “of” Ibsen’s Hedda Gabler. In The Art of Theatre, I argue 
that any of them could be–or, even more strongly, that no performances of any kind are–performances 
“of” a work by Ibsen, at least as that locution is usually understood in the text-based theatrical tradition, 
because the intentional locution, “performance of X,” is systematically misleading.
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8. I owe these cases to a conversation with Bruce Glymour who encouraged me to consider a wider 
range of cases and to answer this particular objection to the proposed success conditions.
9. But compare Paul Woodruff, “Understanding Theatre,” Philosophy and Art, ed. Daniel 
Dahlstrom, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 23 (Washington, D. C.:  Catholic U 
of America P, 1991). Woodruff would not agree with the claim I make here. That is because he has a 
“thicker” conception of what it is to understand than I am employing here.
10. For an entertaining discussion of this phenomenon, see M. Frayn & D. Burke, The Copenhagen 
Papers (New York:  Picador, 2001) 28-30.
11. Conditionals are sentences of the form if . . . then . . . , where what appears in the ellipses 
following “if” and “then” are claims. The “if”-clause is called the “antecedent” of the conditional, and 
the “then”-clause is called the conditional’s “consequent.” Counterfactual conditionals are conditionals, 
usually expressed in the subjunctive mood, that presuppose their antecedents are false. They assert that 
something would have been the case had something else been the case (with the explicit assumption 
that the latter was not, in fact, the case). Counterfactuals are thought to be useful in explaining how 
physical laws–sentences like “All copper conducts electricity”–differ from other generalizations that 
might happen to be true–for example, “Every object on my dining room table conducts electricity.” The 
idea is that if anything were copper –which my pencil is not–it would conduct electricity, but not just 
anything would conduct electricity were it on my dining room table. Counterfactuals are also thought 
to be useful in explaining dispositional properties. Saying this lump of sugar is soluble in water just 
comes to this:  it would dissolve, if it were in water (which it is not).
12. Woodruff claims that “understanding consists largely in having certain emotions” (Woodruff 
13). I take the relatively less controversial and weaker ideas of “reactions” and “mood shifts” as 
evidence of understanding in part because and I wish to remain neutral about a cognitive theory of the 
emotions to which Woodruff is committed.  In this way, his idea of understanding is “thicker” than what 
I am pushing here.” Another reason is that I am concerned to ensure we keep the physical interactions 
between performers and audiences clearly in view. Emotion reactions surely are physical reactions to 
some extent. But it is easy to lose sight of this fact in many cognitivist theories of the emotions, and I 
believe we should not do so.  
13. David Ball, Backwards & Forwards (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois UP, 1983) 60-61.
14. 61.
15. I am relying on a distinction between “determinate answers” with “determinable answers.” 
Some answers are determinate even if we cannot in fact determine what those answers are:  whether 
Albert the Great of England weighed over 150 pounds is a question to which there is a determinate, 
but not a determinable, answer. In the case of many contemporary performances of Hamlet, we seem 
to have the opposite situation:  the answer regarding Hamlet is determinable, but not determinate.
16. Paul Ziff makes a related point about both theatre and dance, especially regarding what can 
be taken in at any single auditing. Imagine, for instance, two people viewing the same performance but 
from different locations. In certain theatre arrangements the position from which two people see the 
performance can make for many differences in what these spectators will have presented to them. Paul 
Ziff, Antiaesthetics (Dordrecht, Holland:  D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984) 87.
17. Woodruff spells out the cognitive uniformity principle in this way:  “Whatever can be 
understood can be understood uniformly; any process that cannot be uniform in the required way is 
not understanding.” What I claim here is a reasonable entailment of Woodruff’s formulation of the 
principle (Woodruff 19-20).
18. The last clause is present to cover the non-discursive signs of performance as discussed in 
§2.
19. David Lewis, Conventions (Oxford:  Blackwell, 2002), ﬁrst published (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 1969) 5. I am not concerned with the defense by Lewis and others of a general account 
of conventions in which reference to intentions can be eliminated and linguistic behavior naturalized. 
The appeal of this work in the present context is motivated by its consistency with the goal of seeking 
to understand audience understanding ﬁrst and then performer meaning when and if that is necessary 
and by the absence of reference to intentions in ﬁguring out what conventions are in play in a given 
context of activity.
20. Seamus Miller, “Coordination, Salience and Rationality,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
24.3 (1991) 362, sums up Lewis’s view of the externality of salience in this way:  “Agents have desires 
and aversions, modes of apprehending the world, histories, and exist in environments that impinge upon 
them. But in that case certain aspects of certain things are going to come to their attention, and others 
not, and some of these are going to strike them more forcefully than others. In short, some things are 
going to stand out; for any agents, including rational agents, some things are salient, others not.”
21. Lewis 5-8.
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22. Lewis 8-24 and 97-100, and Robert Sugden, “The Role of Inductive Reasoning in the Evolution 
of Conventions, Law and Philosophy 17 (1998) 380-381.
23. Sugden 388-395.
24. For more technical discussions of these issues, see Miller 359-370, Sugden 380-395, and Peter 
Vanderschraaf, “Convention as Correlated Equilibrium,” Erkenntnis 42 (1995) 65-87. Miller has used 
similar arguments to defend the general rationality guarantee deriving from choice based on salient 
features alone. I am less concerned with the rationality issue per se than with the question whether the 
fact that theatre is a social institution gives us reason to suppose spectators will ﬁnd pretty much the 
same features salient for roughly the same reasons and producing roughly the same outcomes.
25. Anne Ubersfeld, “The Pleasure of the Spectator,” trans. Pierre Bouillaguet and Charles Jose, 
Modern Drama 25.1 (1982) 128.
26. Much of the work on this part of the essay was ﬁrst done while I was the recipient of a two-week 
visit to Texas Tech University, in Fall 2004, while on a Big 12 Fellowship. I appreciate the discussions 
I had there with Aaron Meskin and Danny Nathan.  I would also like to thank Doug Patterson, for 
pushing me to make the phenomenological character of this essay clearer, and Alberto Voltolini and 
Francesco Orilia for letting me read recent work in progress on the ontology of ﬁctional agents and for 
making useful comments on earlier versions of this essay.
27. It is common among philosophers to subsume whatever we say about characters and events in 
theatrical performances of narrative ﬁctions to a general theory of ﬁctions. In the end, this may be the 
right direction to take for the purposes of metaphysics. But in terms of the epistemology of theatrical 
performances–of how we understand the objects of what is presented to spectators in a performance–this 
is clearly not an option. Many theatrical performances are not narratives at all, let alone ﬁctional 
narratives. If we want a general account of how the contents of performances are perceived, starting 
with that particular and special subset of performances needs considerably more justiﬁcation than is 
usually on offer. The main reason less justiﬁcation is provided, I believe, is that the issues are usually 
taken to be metaphysical rather than epistemological.
28. This case is not entirely imagined:  a ﬁlm version of Hedda Gabler with a similar setting was 
released in November 2004, at the Seattle Film Festival. A stage version was developed in Seattle in 
2000. I have transposed the setting to southern California from its native Washington.
29. The example is inspired by Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz & Guildenstern are Dead (London: 
Faber, 1967).
30. Elinor Fuchs, “Counter-Stagings:  Ibsen against the Grain,” The Death of Character: 
Perspectives on Theatre after Modernism (Bloomington:  Indiana UP, 1996) 52-66. Fuchs’s essay 
provides a basis of what could be a compelling performance, with Tesman and Lovborg in Nietzschean 
conﬂict with Tesman as Apollonian and Lovborg as Dionysian, each writing a competing history of 
civilization (64-66).
31. Sofer is speaking here of props both as parts of the contents of performance and as elements 
used by performers in performances. But, as we will see later in the discussion of the materiality of 
performance elements, there is no on-principle barrier to Sofer’s conﬂation of these (Sofer 2).
32. 20-29.  
33. In thinking this through, I rely heavily on the work regarding demonstrative and recognition 
based identiﬁcation developed by Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, ed. John McDowell (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982), 143-191, 267-298. Evans develops this material in an exploration of Bertrand 
Russell’s claim that, as Evans puts it, “a subject cannot make a judgment about something unless he 
knows which object his judgment is about” (Evans 89). Evans explores the idea that to assign predicates 
to a thing and assess the truth of the application, we must have what he calls “an Idea of the object,” and 
he seeks to ground having an Idea of an object in having capacities to identify the thing demonstratively 
and recognitionally, without having to believe anything about the object to do so. The result is that Evans 
not only makes Russell’s idea more precise, he also removes its unnecessary reference to knowledge or 
even belief content. Evans then builds a theory of varieties of reference on this largely, but re-worked, 
Russellian base. It is the base-level work that is of use in the present context. We can think of what 
follows as providing additional support for Evans’s views on these matters even if Evans would not be 
entirely happy with my strictly epistemological application of that work.
34. The phenomena we are discussing resemble “ﬂocking behavior” of birds, ﬁsh, and ourselves 
in a number of ways. But, in the case of human beings, it is especially important that ﬂocking turns up 
in “cognitive and experiential variables” as well as in physical movements. James Kennedy and Russell 
Eberhart, “Partical Swarm Optimization,” IEEE (1995) 1942-1948; here, quotation is from 1943.
35. “Egocentric space can exist,” Evans argues, “only for an animal in which a complex network 
of connections exists between perceptual input and behavioral output” (Evans 154). Demonstrative 
identiﬁcation is possible because we are the kinds of organisms that respond behaviorally to sensory 
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inputs of spatio-temporal objects and can subsume those dispositions to knowledge of the spatial 
environment.
36. I leave on one side any complications that might attend the added fact that we are concerned 
from this point on only with organisms that are conscious and capable of reasoning.
37. The idea that identiﬁcation of characters and other objects in theatrical performances requires 
tracking in “continuous space” is a view familiar from Susan Sontag’s “Theatre and Film,” Styles of 
Radical Will (New York:  Farrar, Strous, Giroux, 1966) 99-122, especially at 108-109. But I show that 
this tracking can admit of serious, even fairly lengthy, gaps in time.
38. Evans 173-176.
39. Evans intends a realist reading. He explicitly excludes the contents of hallucinations as capable 
of being identiﬁed demonstratively (Evans 173). Nevertheless, for the reasons I offer in the body, I 
think the introduction of metaphysical considerations here is premature.
40. We can now explain why nothing is identiﬁable as Hedda in the chorus-like performance 
described earlier, in which spectators gain only a list of characteristics of Hedda. Nothing physical 
appears in that performance to which spectators are drawn to attach those characteristics. There is no 
experience of that one there that prompts such attachment. Accordingly there is nothing about which 
they are having thoughts; so those spectators are, in thinking about a possible someone called “Hedda” 
are not thinking about her.
41. When a spectator has lost track of a character or when there has been a substantial gap in time 
or place since the original sighting, we seem to be in this situation:  we can see how to show a spectator 
has identiﬁed that one there, but how do we show she has the same character in mind after some interval 
during which she has not kept track of the object? That one may be another character that looks just 
like the former character, or, worse, the character she once had in mind may have changed beyond 
recognition during the interval in which the spectator had not tracked her/him (Evans 272-273). Evans 
notes that this does indeed entail there are cases that are undecidable, but this does not undermine the 
capacity to recognize or the concept of the capacity of recognitional identiﬁcation.
42. 280.
43. Paul Thom, For An Audience (Philadelphia:  Temple UP, 1993) 4-6. For a thorough discussion 
of three desiderata of any adequate speciﬁcation of performance space, see James R. Hamilton, “Theatre,” 
The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd edition, eds. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes 
(London:  Routledge, 2001) 585-596.
44. See Augusto Boal, Theatre of the OPed (New York:  Theatre Communications Group, 1990), 
Peter Brook, The Empty Space (London:  Simon & Schuster, 1995), and Hollis Huston, The Actor’s 
Instrument:  Body, Theory, Stage (Ann Arbor, U of Michigan P, 1992) 1-16, 68-89, and 111-126. There 
is another strategy, derivable from H. P. Grice’s theory of communication. The reason I do not pursue 
that here is that the strategy fails to meet the second desideratum, for reasons discussed in Hamilton, 
“Theatre.” 
45. The claim that “liveness” confers a value to theatrical performance in contrast to movie and 
other “mediated” performances is rightly and decisively contested, I believe, in Philip Auslander, 
Liveness:  Performance in a Mediatized Culture (London:  Routledge, 1999) 38-43.
46. The case I have been making is conceptual. Some empirical evidence related to the process 
I have described, and its reliance on spectator’s ability to recognize objects because the spaces they 
occupy constitute a familiar locale, can be found in Steven P. Tipper and Bruce Weaver, “The Medium 
of Attention:  Location-Based, Object-Centred, or Scene-Based?” Visual Attention, ed. R. D. Wright 
(Oxford:  Oxford UP, 1998) 77-107.
47. It is imaginable, though perhaps not without considerable imaginative stretch, that this 
company had prepared a production in which Hedda must have such a gap and must lisp. They may 
even have required the performer doing this role to agree to tooth removal before rehearsals in order 
to secure the part.  But you are given no reason to think this has happened here. At no time and in no 
manner, for example, do the other characters make something of Hedda’s appearance and her manner 
of speaking.
48. I do not mean to suggest that double focus is the experience of having one’s attention drawn 
to these things simultaneously. That may happen, but it is not crucial to anything I am investigating 
that this ever be so. It is enough that spectators commonly ﬁnd themselves sometimes focusing on the 
performed object and sometimes focusing on the performers themselves.
49. See Jonas Barish, The Anti-Theatrical Prejudice (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  U of California 
Reprint Edition, 1985) for a detailed study of how performers’ bodies in particular are at the root of 
common misgivings–moral and non-moral–about theatrical performers and performances.
50. Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed (New York, Viking Press, 1971).
51. Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Weinberg, “Imagine That!” Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics 
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and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran (London:  Blackwell Publishers, 2005) 222-235.
52. Marvin Carlson, “Invisible Presences–Performance Intertextuality,” Theatre Research 
International 19.2 (1994) 113.
53. 112, 113.
54. Herbert Blau, Take Up the Bodies:  Theatre and the Vanishing Point (Urbana:  U of Illinois 
P, 1982) 83.
55. Hollis Huston, The Actor’s Instrument:  Body, Theory, Stage (Ann Arbor:  U of Michigan P, 
1992) 45.
56. Stanton B. Garner, Jr., “Object, Objectivity, and the Phenomenal Body,” Bodied Spaces: 
Phenomenology and Performance in Contemporary Drama (Ithaca:  Cornell UP, 1994) 87-119.
57. Bert O. States, “Introduction,” and “The World on Stage,” Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: 
on the Phenomenology of Theatre (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  U of California P,1985) 1-15, 19-47, 
see especially 6-9 and 23-29.
58. Sofer shares States’s worries about the refusal of semiotic analyses to acknowledge the 
phenomenological impact of material things in performances, especially props (Sofer 6-16, 18-19).
59. Eli Rozik, “The Corporeality of the Actor’s Body:  The Boundaries of Theatre and the 
Limitations of Semiotic Methodology,” Theatre Research International 24.2 (1999) 198-211. See also 
Umberto Eco, “Semiotics of Theatrical Performance,” The Drama Review:  TDR 21.1 (1977) 107-117, 
and Kier Elam, The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama (London:  Routledge, 1980) 4-27.
60. Elam 11-14.
61. Bert O. States, “The World on Stage” and “The Scenic Illusion:  Shakespeare and Naturalism,” 
Great Reckonings in Little Rooms:  On the Phenomenology of Theatre (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  U 
of California P, 1985) 19-47 and 48-79, see especially 30-37 and 70-79.
62. Anne Ubersfeld, “Text-performance,” trans. Frank Collins, Reading Theatre, eds. Paul Perron 
and Patrick Debbeche (Toronto:  U of Toronto P, 1999) 3-31, see especially 24-26.  (This is a translation 
of Lire le theatre 1, Editions Belin, 1996)
63. My analysis here is anticipated by an argument concerning this same point in James R. 
Hamilton, “‘Illusion’ and the Distrust of Theatre,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41.1 (1982) 
39-50. In that essay I argued there could be no illusion because no one with the knowledge she is in a 
theatre can be taken in. Here I argue for the weaker claim that, for that same reason, illusion does not 
play a signiﬁcant role in theatre’s deliverances. I thank Dom Lopes for pointing out the argument for 
the stronger claim set forth in that article is unsound.
64. The idea itself is ubiquitous and important. See Marco De Marinis, “The Performance Text,” 
The Semiotics of Performance, trans. Aine O’Healy, (Bloomington:  Indiana UP, 1993) 47-59; reprinted 
in The Performance Studies Reader, ed. Henry Bial (London and New York:  Routledge, 2004) 232-
251, especially 235, 242-244.  See also Alice Rayner, “The Audience:  Subjectivity, Community and 
the Ethics of Listening,” The Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 7.2 (1993) 9.
65. It is not clear that what is seen in movies is movement in space or only apparent movement. 
See Noël Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1996) and Gregory 
Currie, Image and Mind:  Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1995) 
for a good introduction to the details of this discussion. In either case, there will be some similarity 
between theatre and movies insofar as movies are construed as a depictive art––so that the stage picture, 
moment to moment, plays a similar role in grasping a theatrical performance to that which it plays in 
grasping a movie.
66. For a useful presentation of this kind of critique, see Shannon Jackson, “Practice and 
Performance:  Modernist Paradoxes and Literalist Legacies,” Professing Performance:  Theatre in the 
Academy from Philology to Performativity (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2004) 109–233.
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